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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsJACOB J.

Case No. 16534
L&~ORIE,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was tried and convicted of possession of
a dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony, a seconddegree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-503(2)
(1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury in the Seventh
Judicial District Court, in and for Grand County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, presiding.

Appellant was

found guilty on January 23, 1979, of the offense charged and
was sentenced to serve 1 to fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming
the judgment of the lower court.
STATEHENT OF THE FACTS
On October 14, 1978, Jessee Powell, an off-duty
trooper

for the Utah Highway Patrol, stopped his truck

at the scene of an automobile accident
possibly injured (T. 17).

to assist anyone

Mr. Powell administered first

aid to the appellant who had been a passenger in the vehicle
that had crashed.

Mr. Powell also prevented the appellant

from leaving the scene in another passerby's car because
of his belief that the appellant was intoxicated (T. 18).
Shortly thereafter, Charles Durrant, a twelve-year
old boy who was with Mr. Powell, observed that the appellant
was holding what appeared to be a sawed-off shotgun (T. 36,
43, 50).

Mr. Powell never actually saw the appellant with

the shotgun.

However, he did see the appellant run down intc

an old wash in a crunched over position.

The appellant

was joined in the wash by Hr. Lowery, the driver of the
vehicle that had

crashed (T. 20, 25).

Trooper David Bailey of the Utah Highway Patrol
arrived at the scene and went with

~r.

Powell down into

the wash where they were met by the appellant and
Lowery (T. 20).
his hand

Mr.

The appellant had a metal scabbard in

(T. 52)
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under the influence of alcohol and the appellant was
arrested for public intoxication.

Both were transported

by Trooper Bailey to Green River, Utah (T. 52, 53).
After the arrest, Mr. Powell and the two boys
who were with him, searched the wash and found the sword to
the scabbard, a sawed-off shotgun and a shotgun shell (T. 22).
The appellant denied owning the gun and claimed to
have never seen it before (T. 60).

The appellant was charged

with possession of a dangerous weapon while on parole for a
felony.

On January 23, 1979, the appellant was tried by a

jury in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand
County.

To prove that the appellant was on parole for a

felony, the State relied upon the testimony of Joseph L.
Waters, a parole agent from Colorado and State's exhibit one:
the Parole Agreement and the Judgment and Conviction Sentence
and Mittimus

of the appellant.

The trial court ruled, over

the objection of the defense attorney, that this evidence
was not hearsay (T. 8, 14).

The state did not prove that

the sawed-off shotgun in the possession of the appellant was
capable of operation.

The appellant was convicted of

possession of a dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony
and sentenced to serve 1 to 15 years at the Utah State
~rison.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY
ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE OFFERED
BY THE STATE TO PROVE THAT THE
APPELLANT VIAS ON PAROLE AFTER BEING
CONVICTED OF A FELONY.
The appellant contends that the testimony of Mr.
Waters, a Colorado parole agent, and State's Exhibit 1,
the appellant's parole agreements and Judgement of Conviction
Sentence and

Mittimus,

were

improperly admitted into

evidence at trial because of Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, "Hearsay Evidence Excluded, -Exceptions."

The

appellant attempts to interpret the possible exceptions to
the hearsay rule to make them inapplicable to the present
case.

Subsection 13 of Rule 63 reads as follows:
(13).
Business Entries and the Like.
Writings offered as memoranda or records
of acts, conditions or events to prove
the facts stated therein, if the judge
finds that they were made in the regular
course of a business at or about the time
of the act, condition or event recorded,
and that the sources of information from
which made and the method and circumstances
of their preparation were such as to
indicate their trustworthiness;

The appellant contends that this exception does not permit
State's Exhibit 1 to be entered as evidence because it
was prepared by a deputy clerk of the Second Judicial Court
of Colorado, and not by an emoloyee of the Colorado Division
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of Parole (see appellant's brief page 8-9).

Such an

interpretation is too narrow because it ignores

the spirit

of the hearsay exceptions and the case law regarding the
admissibility of hearsay evidence.

The correct intent of

subsection 13 of Rule 63 is to allow the trial judge to
admit the record if he is satisfied that the preparation and
keeping of the records is, "such as to indicate their
trustworthiness."

In the present case, this criteria was

met and the judge determined that the evidence was trustworthy.
All four documents contained in state's exhibit 1 were
properly notarized as true and correct copies

(T. 8-15).

Furthermore, the trial judge questioned Hr. Waters as follows:
THE COURT: Mr. Waters, these documents
are kept--of which these are certified
copies, are kept in the usual course of
your duties? They're within your office;
are they?
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
under lock and key.

They're kept

THE COURT: These are actual copies
of the documents that you have there and
that you use in the course of your supervision of the various people that come
under your control; is that correct?
THE

~ITNESS.

Yes.

That's correct.

I!R. BENCE:
I'll renew my request,
you Honor. May Exhibit 1 be received?

THE COURT: Yes.
received in evidence.

Exhibit 1 will be

MR. MORTENSEK:
I have to object
to that stre:-Juousl\·, vour Honor.
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THE COURT: You have objected.
I'm
overruling it.
It clearly comes under an
exception to the Hearsay Rule that it's
kept in the usual course of business and
under supervision. The testimony was it
was under his supervision and control and
had been for a number of years and the Court
has the right to let him know why he had it
under his supervision, and that these are
the documents out of his file and that
justifies that situation.
(T. 14).
The trial judge was satisfied that the records
in State's Exhibit 1 were genuine records kept in the regular
course of business and that they were trustworthy and thus
he properly received them into evidence.
Case law substantiates the proposition that the
criteria of trustworthiness is at the heart of the hearsay
exceptions.

The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Sibert, 310

P.2d 388, 6 Utah 2d 198 (Utah, 1957), said in reference to
hearsay, "Such testimony is not admissible on the grounds
that it lacks trustworthiness."

(310 P.2d at 390).

United States v. Holland, 378 F. Supp 144

In

(1974), the Court

said, "We believe that the focus of the hearsay rule and its
exceptions is the trustworthiness, the reliability of the
out of court declaration."

(378 F. Supp. at 158).

Oltman v. Hiller, 407 F.2d 376 (7th Circuit, 1969);
v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 17
Curtiss National Bank of

~liami

See also:
Pope

(D.C. Cal. 1968); Sabation \'.

Springs, 415 F.2d 632

1969).

(C.A. Fla.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent submits that because the emphasis
of the hearsay exceptions goes to the reliability of the
testimony or record, the appellant's overly narrow construction of subsection 13 of Rule 65 has no merit.
trial judge determined that Mr. Waters' testimony

The
and

State's Exhibit 1 were reliable, and he therefore acted
properly in allowing this evidence to come into court.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT IS ACCORDED A LARGE
MEASURE OF DISCRETION IN DETERMINING
MATTERS OF EVIDENCE AND SHOULD ONLY
BE REVERSED IF THIS DISCRETION IS
ABUSED.
It is a well-established rule that the trial court
has wide discretion in allowing evidence to be received into
court and unless there is a clear abuse of discretion, the
appellate court will not overrule the trial court's decision.
In reference to alleged hearsay records of evidence, the
Washington Supreme Court said, "In this State, the ruling of
the trial judge in admitting or excluding such records is
given much weight and will not be reversed unless there
has

~een

a manifest abuse of discretion.

Mail Line, 257 P.2d 179, 42 \'lash. 2d 590

Cantrill v. American
(Wash. 1953)."

rule is followed in most all appellate courts.

v.

Da1ms,

537 P.2d 754,

State v. Cooper,
Butler-\'. l'iong,

36 Colo. App.

109

504 P.2d 978, 161 Hont.
573 P.2d 86, 117 Ariz.

(Colo.
85,

395

See:

This

Short

1975);

(Mont. 1972);

(Ariz. 1977).
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The Utah Supreme Court has held that it will not
overrule the trial court unless there is a clear abuse
of discretion in cases involving:
State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216

evidence in general,

(Utah, 1976), evidence of an

expert witness, Lamb v. Bangert, 525 P.2d 602

(Utah, 1974),

the materiality of evidence, Martin v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
565 P.2d 1139

(Utah, 1977), and many others.

See West's

Pacific Digest 3, Appeal and Error XIV(f).
The rule that the appellate court will not overrule
the judgment of the trial court absent abuse of discretion
applies to the present case.

As mentioned, the trial judge

examined the witness himself to determine the reliability
of the evidentiary records, State's Exhibit 1.

The judge

was satisfied that they were reliable and there is no
indication of any abuse of discretion.

The respondent urges

this Court to uphold the decision of the trial court.
POINT II.
A.

THE STATE WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PROVE
THAT THE S!-!OTGU!'J \~AS OPERABLE IN
ORDER FOR IT TO BE A DANGEROUS
vJL".PON.
The appellant was convicted of possession a
dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony under
Utah Code Ann. ,

( 19 53) , as amended.

§

76-10-SOl;

However, the state

neverproved that the sawed-off shotgun in the appellant's
possession was capable of opera~ion.
~he appella~t contends
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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that absent this proof, he was not in possession of a
dangerous weapon and therefore should not have been convicted.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Nielson, 554 P.2d 489
(Utah, 1975); held that a gun was a dangerous weapon whether
it was loaded or unloaded.

The respondent argues that for

there to be any merit to the appellant's argument on this
point, the court would apparently need to reverse its
decision in Nielson and

hold that for a gun to be a dangerous

weapon it would need to be loaded and otherwise capable of
operation.

The appellant is seeking a reversal of Nielson.

(Appellant's brief, page 15).
The respondent urges this Court to uphold its
decision in Nielson and rule that the sawed-off shotgun in
the appellant's possession was a dangerous weapon, whether
the state proved it was capable of operation or not.
is the position of the majority of

It

jurisdictions that have

addressed the issue that a firearm is a dangerous weapon
whether loaded or unloaded.
803

See Reed v. State, 199 So.2d

(Hiss. 1967); People v. Law, 39 A.D. 2d 904, 334 N.Y.S.

2d 398

(1972); State v. Dorsey, 491 S.W. 2d 301 (Mo. 1973);

United States v.

\~are,

315 F. Supp.

1333 (1970).

The law

stating that a 9un is a dangerous weapon whether loaded or
not is based on sound reasoning.
310, '?2 A.

859

In State v. Quail, 5 Boyce

(Del. 1914), the Court said:
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We think it quite immaterial whether
the revolver be loaded or not, because
such an instrument is commonly regarded
as a deadly weapon without regard to its
condition. If the absence of bullts
would make the weapon a harmless one,
then any condition that would prevent
its being used at the time injuriously,
would have a like effect. For example,
the ~ain spring might be out of order,
and according to the defendant's contention this would make the instrument
not deadly within the meaning of the
statute.
If we should sustain the contention
of the defendant we fear that many
persons would carry a pistol unloaded
but at the same time have bullets secreted
upon their person to be used if desired.
As we have said the law was intended
to discourage and prevent so far as
possible, the carrying of weapons that
are commonly and rightfully regarded as
deadly. We think that a revolver, even
though unloaded or in such a defective
condition that it could not be fired,
cannot be lawfully carried in this state
concealed upon the person.
The motion
of the defendant is refused.
In relationship

to

§

76-10-503 (2), Utah Code Ann.,

(1953),

as amended, "Possession of a dangerous weapon while on
parole for a felony," whether a sawed-off shotgun is capable
of operation is not the main concern.

The real issue is that

a person possessing a sawed-off shotgun, operable or not,
has power over others through the threat of death of serious
bodily injury.

This Court said in Nielson, "\Je believe

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the statute's purpose was to deter those convicted of
violent crimes from thereafter having guns, loaded or not."
In People v. Halley, 268 N.E. 2d 449, the Illinois
appellate court said:
l~e think it clear, however, that
it was not a necessary part of the
state's case to prove that the pistols
were loaded with bullets, contained a
firing pin, had open barrels or were
otherwise in an operable condition.
It
is established that it is unnecessary
to prove that a gun is a deadly weapon.
People v. Nerritt, 367 Ill., 521, 12
N.E.2d 7; People v. Dwyer, 324 Ill. 363,
155 N.E. 216.

The ruling in Halley applies directly to this case.

The

trial court did not need to prove that the shotgun was
operable and therefore dangerous, because the Utah Supreme
Court had already held that a gun is a dangerous weapon,
whether loaded or not.

B.
BECAUSE THE STATE HAS NOT REQUIRED
TO PROVE THAT THE SHOTGUN I~AS A
DANGEROUS WEAPON, THE APPELLANT'S
CONVICTION OF A SECOND DEGREE FELONY
\·JAS CORRECT.
Because of the reasoning in Point II A. above,
the appellant was properly convicted of "possession of a
dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony," under
Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-10-503 (2)

degree :'elony.

Utah Code l'nn.,

(1953), as amended, a second§

76-3-203 (2)

(1953), as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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amended, sets forth the term of imprisonment for a seconddegree felony as follows:
Felony conviction--Indeterminate
term of imprisonment--Increase of
sentence if firearrro used--A person who
has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as follows:
(2)
In the case of a felony of
the second degree, for a term at not less
than one year nor more than 15 years but
if the trier of fact finds a firearm or
a facsimile or the representation of
a firearm was used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted
for a term of one year to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted
for an indeterminate term not to exceed
five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently;
The appellant was sentenced to 1 to 15 years at the Utah
State Prison in accordance with Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-3-203(2)

(1953), as amended, and there was no error in imposing this
sentence.

This sentence should be upheld.
POINT III.
IF THE TRIAL COURT DID COMMIT ERR,
THE PROPER RE~lliDY SHOULD BE A RETRIAL.
Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-1-501 (1953)

as amended, provides:

(1) A defendant in a criminal
proceeding is presumed to be innocent
until each element of the offense charged
against him is provec1 beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In absence of such proof, the
defendant shall be acquitted.
Emphasis added.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The a?pellant contends that on the basis of this statute and
Points I and II of his brief, the appellant should be
acquitted.

The respondent argues that even if this Court

should find that the trial court erred, despite the arguments
of Point I and II herein, the proper remedy is not acquittal,
but a new trial.

Respondent submits that the appellant again

places too narrow of an interpretation upon the statute in
question.

Utah Code Ann., § 76-l-501 (1953), as amended, states,

"In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted."
In the present case, even if the trial court did err by allowing
the alleged hearsay evidence,

(Point I), to be entered into

court, this issue can be remanded and proven by the very
evidence the appellant alleged would have been proper at
trial.

There was no absence of proof at the trial court,

but merely the use of proof to which the appellant objected.
In State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600
(Utah, 1951), the Utah Supreme Court said when speaking about
the value of stolen property in a larceny case:
The major portion of the Attorney
General's brief deals with the contention that if the failure to prove
value recuires a reversal of the case, the
defendant is not entitled to go free,
but only to a new trial. With this we
agree. -It is well settled that reversal
of a conviction at the instance of the
defendant, and subsequent remand of the
case for new trial does not constitute
the defendant twice in jeopardy to entitle
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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him to go free.
15 Am. Jur. 89,
Crim. Law, Sec. 427; People v.
Travers, 77 Cal. 176, 19 P. 268; People
v. Eppinger, 109 Cal. 294, 41 P. 1037;
People v. Stratton, 136 Cal.App. 201,
28 P.2d 695. And see Sec. 105-39-2,
U.C.A. 1943, and State v. Kessler, 15
Utah 142, 49 P. 293.
Appellant submits that this case is supplanted by Utah Code
Ann.,

§

76-1-501 (1953), as amended, and thus the appellant

should be acquitted.

Respondent submits that appellant badly

misconstrues both the statute and the ruling of Lawrence.

The

Lawrence case held that the remand of a case did not violate
the constitutional guarantee of protection against double
jeopardy.

This issue is completely distinguishable from the

absence of proof issue in Utah Code Ann.,
as amended.

§

76-1-501 (1953),

State v. Lawrence, was reaffirmed in 1971 by the

Utah Supreme Court in State v. Jaramillo, 481 P.2d 394

(Utah,

1971), and is in accordance with the United States Supreme Court
cases of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395
2072, 2089, 23 L.Ed. 2d 656

Code Ann.,

§

711, 89 S.Ct.

(1969), and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe,

412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.
Utah

u.s.

2d 714

(1973).

77-42-3 and 77-42-4

(1953), as

amended, nake it clear that the Supreme Court has the power
to order a nevl trial if it deems necessary.
§

Utah Code Ann.,

77-1-501 (1953), as amended does not bind the Supreme Court
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into acquitting the appellant because in this case there is
sufficient evidence.

Therefore, if this Court finds that

there was error at the trial, the case should be remanded for
retrial, but the appellant should not be acquitted.
CONCLUSION
The arguments raised by appellant in seeking to
have his conviction for the offense of possession of a
dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony, Utah Code
Ann.,

§

76-10-503 (2)

(1953), as amended, are without merit.

The trial court found that the evidence relied
upon to establish that the appellant was on parole for
a felony was reliable and fell within the hearsay exceptions.
The jury convicted the appellant of being in the possession
of a dangerous weapon, i.e.:

a sawed-off shotgun, and it

was unnecessary for the State to prove that this sawed-off
shotgun was capable of operation, loaded or not.

Based upon

the foregoing points and authorities, appellant's conviction
was proper and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOiv
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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